Focusing on a case study of Estonia's major political parties' relations with the ethnic Russian electorate, the article examines the role of ethnic minority policies in the electoral appeal of nation-wide parties towards the ethnic minority electorate, attempting to assess whether pursuing efficient minority-related policies is a necessary precondition for a nationwide party achieving electoral success among ethnic voters, and whether the migration of an ethnic minority electorate from ethnic parties to mainstream parties can be considered a sign of successful accommodation. Applying the theoretical concept of "informational shortcuts", the article assesses persuasion strategies employed by Estonian political parties in their appeal towards the minority electorate, exemplifying the ways in which mainstream political parties can consolidate their monopoly over ethnic voters without prioritizing special minority-related policies.
INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of socialist multiethnic federations in Europe along ethnic lines imposed ethnicity as one of the fundamental political cleavages within many of the newly-emerged states. In the states characterized by a considerable degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the politicization of ethnicity at the very outset of democratic transition tended to generate discrepancies between official ethnicity-related policies and social realities. Set as a crucial factor at the turning moment of history, the ethnic dimension not only made an impact on various aspects of policies, institutions, party programs, beliefs and the expectations of electorates, but in certain cases manifested trends of correlating with other relevant cleavages in society.
Among the states that (re-)emerged on the map of Europe in the early 1990s, Estonia is perhaps the most eloquent example of a nation-state that defined its identity in explicit ethnic primordialist terms, whereas the mechanisms of the practical implementation of the conception of political membership had clear ethnopolitical implications, resulting in an all-encompassing stratification overlapping with ethnic divisions. Starting with the premise that the overlap between ethnic and socioeconomic cleavages shapes perceptions of group interests along ethnic lines, this article explores ethnicity as a dividing line in electoral and post-electoral political processes. It presumes that a shift from "frozen" ethnicitybased perceptions of social and political realities toward civic concepts of social and political participation and a higher degree of social cohesion could be achieved only by means of political attention toward sensitive issues for the minority community.
Assuming that perceptions of individual interests derive from concrete every-day existential problems, while an individual's identification with a group strongly correlates with perceptions of commonality of individual and group interests, a series of questions arise with regard to the way in which a relatively deprived ethnic minority group may impact nation-wide politics. For example, in which way do ethnic cleavages influence the nation-wide political spectrum and programs of individual parties? What is the role of an ethnic minority electorate in the electoral competition of nation-wide parties? Which tactics of electoral appeal on the part of political parties prove to be effective with regard to ethnic voters? All of these questions could be summarized by the main objective of this article, which aspires to find out the extent to which electoral orientation of nation-wide parties toward a sizeable and relatively deprived ethnic minority prompts them to consider policies aimed at improving the minority's situation in relevant policy areas. The case of empirical research, expands the second one and is based on the assumption that an average voter is unable and unlikely to engage in collection and thorough evaluation of information on parties' policies. Instead, ethnicity is regarded as an "informational shortcut" that, in a situation of uncertainty, provides ethnic voters with credible cues on various political forces' favorability towards their group. 3 In order to be considered ethnic voters, an ethnic community should demonstrate a correlation between ethnic belonging and electoral choices. Seeing the politicization of ethnicity in a broader context, I pay particular attention to mass awareness that an individual's prospects in the given society are conditioned by his membership in a particular ethnic group. Perceptions of ethnicity as a crucial factor shaping individual prospects are typical for societies affected by historical ethnic cleavages: aware of negative past experiences, members of the ethnic group tend to associate their individual interests with those of the group, whereas ethnic identity may serve as a group-based label or cue helping them to reduce uncertainty in a variety of micro-and macro-level social and political contexts and relationships. 4 As a rational actor, the ethnic voter thus makes his choices, being guided by "ethnic credentials" exhibited by various parties, or party "labels" seen through ethnic lens. These cognitive shortcuts that guide the voters' choices are based on information that is easily acquired and is usually related to party ideology and other relevant information that helps voters evaluate the extent to which a party is supportive of their group. 5 In shaping minority-related policies, parties are important as channels of legislative representation of their voters' political preferences and sources of policy expertise. Typically, ethnic minority representation in a democracy has two available venues: ethnic minority parties and mainstream (nation-wide) parties.
Assuming an ethnic voter is a rational actor, the representativeness of a party has to be taken into account when assessing the voter's proneness to choose between these two types of channels. The party's representativeness is contingent on its capacity to access government, which may be achieved by means of influencing policy within a ruling coalition, aligning with the government, or having a sufficient representation in the legislature in order to voice the group's claims. Thus, the ethnic group can exert influence over policymaking by means of access to government, which can be achieved either by an ethnic party's joining a coalition government, exerting influence on a minority government, or with the ethnic group's representation in government through a nonethnic party. 6 Therefore, members of the ethnic group are expected to give their support to the party as long as the party is representative of their interests, and are likely abandon it and switch to another party as soon as they evaluate that the latter party better represents the group. Theorists dealing with the utility of ethnic voting suggest that ethnic voters' incentive to give electoral support to a party persists as long as the party responds to their expectations with regard to policy enactment 7 .
The voter is guided by a cost-benefit calculation, where the benefit refers to the voter's policy preferences, while the cost is determined by the ability of the party to enact policy: the lower is the party's ability to enact the voter's preferred policies, the higher are the costs incurred by the voter.
In this respect, ethnic parties differ from nonethnic ones in one important aspect: acting as interest groups aimed at benefitting a particular ethnic community, they, as a rule, have an elaborated set of specific minority-related policy measures, while nation-wide parties do not tend to prioritize minority issues in their appeal to the electorate.
In addition, crucial limits to ethnic representation in elected bodies are set by the size of the respective ethnic electorate. Therefore, in case the ethnic electorate 5 Theorists of voting behavior consider gathering political information as costly to an average voter in terms of time and energy. Therefore, the voter is prone to rely on "free" sources of information, among which the most important source is information obtained from contacts with fellow group members. The question remains whether the migration of ethnic minority electorate from ethnic parties to mainstream parties can be considered a sign of a successful accommodation, reducing the need for prioritizing specific minority-related policies.
In the present article I study the case of Estonia's Russians in an attempt to which minority politics are structured through major nation-wide parties. The analysis is focused on the strategies applied by the parties vis-à-vis the minority electorate, attempting to find out the degree to which nation-wide parties tend to exploit the correlation between individual and group prospects, the ways in which these parties create their reputation with regard to ethnic groups, as well as the degree to which their orientation toward the minority electorate fosters their involvement in minority-related policies.
ESTONIA'S RUSSIANS AS ETHNIC VOTERS
The core of post-Soviet Estonia's ethnopolitical dilemma can be summarized as a stark contrast between the official ideology of the monoethnic Estonian nationstate and the country's nearly bi-communal ethnodemographic composition. 10 Notably, the two decades that have passed since the restoration of Estonian statehood did not bring about significant changes to the main principles of official citizenship, language and migration policies: based on the concept of the state and citizenry framed in ethnic primordialist terms, they were accompanied neither by an official recognition of collective legal status 11 of the Russian community nor by practices of positive discrimination towards it on the part of the state. 12 A notable degree of underrepresentedness of non-Estonians in the political life of the country suggests that a gradually increasing share of non-Estonians in the citizenry did not lead to an increase in importance of their role in politics. 13 The share of Russian The main principles of ethnicity-related policies, enshrined in the agreements of coalition governments, included citizenship policies based on a rigid procedure of naturalization, focused on passing a language exam, and an absolute monopoly of the Estonian language in the public sphere and in the economy. 13 Initially, citizenship was granted to less than 40.000 out of 430.000 of non-Estonians living in Estonia. As a result of disfranchisement of absolute majority of the non-Estonian population, in the referendum on the Constitution, held on June 28, 1992, the number of people entitled to vote shrank to 60% of the pre-independence electorate. Nevertheless, the subsequent years marked a steady trend of Estonia's ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 4, NUMBER Before moving to an analysis of the evolution and peculiarities of the system of political participation of the Russian community, we turn to an assessment of whether the application of the "ethnic voters" approach to Estonia's Russians is justified.
Numerous research projects on the socioeconomic situation of Estonia's Russian community confirm that over the first two decades since the restoration of Estonian statehood, structural changes in economy, privatization and legislative policy in Estonia generated socioeconomic inequality which overlapped with ethnic cleavages in the society. 17 The reversal of economic resources led to the socioeconomic dependence of Russians on the Estonian political community. 18 In all cases that a legal, economic, and social difference occurred, it was to the detriment of non-Estonians: the latter manifested significant differences in employment structure, income level, higher unemployment rate, job insecurity, bigger discrepancy between level of education and opportunities to get a job corresponding to their qualifications. 19 Moreover, the trends over the two decades proved that Estonian citizenship, Estonian language proficiency and higher Integration Foundation revealed that non-Estonians assessed their economic chances worse than Estonians, and the gap in the subjective assessment of their situation between the two groups was increasing every year. 22 Thus, in 2010, 91%
of Russophones believed ethnic Estonians to be in more favorable position and to have higher incomes and better socioeconomic prospects. In addition, the majority of non-Estonians believed ethnic Estonians to have better opportunities for their children's education (80%), political activities (93%) and obtaining a governing office in state and municipal institutions (95%).
In the sphere of culture and language use, the official course aimed at establishing Estonian as the sole language of the public life in the long run proved to be a failure, as shown by the trends of the media use of the Russian community. 23 Even more importantly, the transition of Russian gymnasiums to
Estonian as the language of instruction was met with skepticism by the population affected by it. 24 Against this background, contrasting interpretations of history, retained by the two communities, in the long run transcended the realm of history proper: the protests over the removal of the Soviet Army monument from the centre of Tallinn turned into a symbolic manifestation of discontent over the overall marginalization of the Russian community in Estonia's public life and an outburst of mass mobilization in support of bigger "voice" opportunities for non-Estonians in Estonia. 25 Therefore, abundant socioeconomic research and survey data reveal a series of preconditions for Russian-speakers in Estonia to act as ethnic voters, highly aware of the fact that their opportunities in the society depend on their ethnic 20 Even beside the possession of citizenship and Estonian language proficiency, the Estonian Human Development Report explicitly states that the very fact of belonging to an ethnic minority reduces the probability of a person being employed in an executive position or as a top specialist in the public sector (Kairi Kasearu, supra note 16: 49). 21 background. Besides, the available data distinguishes the following main issues on which Estonia's Russian community manifested collective awareness of its distinct interests: equal opportunities in social, economic and political life, on the labor market, the status of the Russian language, availability and quality of Russianlanguage education. These issues have to be taken into consideration when assessing approaches to minority policies on the part of leading political forces.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA
Since Therefore, in monopolizing the political representation of the Russianspeaking community, the KE benefited from the absence of alternative channel for the Russian community: the Russian parties were marginalized and proved to be unable to represent its interests, while other Estonian parties did not manage to establish contact with the Russian electorate, prioritizing an appeal to the ethnic Estonian electorate, based on issues dividing the two communities.
As of writing (2011), the most recent developments highlighted three trends:
an increasing dependence of the KE on the Russian electorate, an increasing political isolation and apathy of the latter, and the definitive consolidation of the Russian voters' support for the KE. . 32 In this situation, the KE experienced negative consequences of its own previously adopted strategy of treating ethnic Russian parties as opponents and consistently pushing them off the political field. In a short-term perspective, the Russian parties, indeed, were their competitors over the same electorate. In a long-term perspective, nevertheless, the KE prevented the emergence of potential allies on the left side of the spectrum. 33 parliamentary elections, the overall activity of the Russian-speaking electorate was by 10-15% lower than that of the Estonians: the turnout in Pirita was 72%, in
Nõmme it was 68%; while the turnout both in Lasnamäe and in Põhja- Tallinn 
REPRESENTATION OF RUSSIAN POLITICS IN MAJOR ESTONIAN POLITICAL PARTIES
The theoretical literature reviewed earlier in this article suggests that the degree of major political parties' representativeness of an ethnic minority can be assessed in several dimensions: addressing issues relevant for the minority in main party policy programs; promotion of minority members on party lists and for other relevant offices; and promotion of actual minority-related policies. Then I summarize the practice of the major Estonian political parties according to all of the above-mentioned criteria and the significance of these practices for electoral appeals of political parties to the minority community.
PARTY POLICY PROGRAMS
Throughout the two decades, not a single Estonian party has elaborated efficient all-encompassing program documents dedicated to ethnic minority issues.
Nevertheless, various parties gave proof of different practices in this respect. Nevertheless, the first Estonian political party to introduce a minority-related clause into its program was the KE. 39 The program, generally in line with the goals of integration policy pursued by the state, raised several problems faced by the non-Estonian population: the alienation and second-rate role of national minorities in the society, their underrepresentation in the Government, Parliament, local municipalities and the public sector, the structural unemployment of skilled workers among non-Estonians, a disproportionate share of non-citizens in the society, the continuing isolation of Estonian and Russian communities, an uncertain future of Russian schools, and the social alienation and marginalization of minorities. In order to manage these problems, the party proposed a set of measures covering social, economic and cultural policies that altogether were aimed at rendering the "one-sided" integration policies 40 more systematic. The program formulated a general goal of passing anti-discriminatory laws and creating a system of their implementation (ombudsmen, inspections, courts), as well as measures aimed at 37 Among the most significant effects of the 2007 crisis, the KE-led initiative of the Tallinn City authorities to organize regular public debates "Civic Peace" intended to "break the ice" on integrationrelated issues is notable. 38 Comparing the two rival organizations for Estonia's political renewal on the eve of independence, the Popular Front had a more liberal stance on language and citizenship issues than the Congress of Estonia. Nevertheless, the subsequent period saw an equalization of attitudes between the two organizations. In the long run, the PF and the political forces that emerged out of it adopted the legal restorationist model of citizenry, initially promoted by the Congress (see Vello Pettai, "The Construction of State Identity and Its Legacies: Legal Restorationism in Estonia," Ab Imperio 3 (2007)). 39 
MINORITY-RELATED POLITICAL PRACTICE
In their minority-related political practice, even those Estonian political parties that provided for representation of Russians in the Parliament demonstrated limited inclusivity towards minority claims. With respect to real political power, the 42 E.g., in Tallinn City Assembly elected in 2005, 24 of 63 deputies were non-Estonians, overwhelmingly members of the KE (63% of 32 members of KE faction was non-Estonian; in contrast, there were only 2 non-Estonian members in the RE faction, and only 1 non-Estonian in the IRL faction). 43 In 2011, Jevgeni Ossinovski became the first Russian deputy elected to the Parliament from the SDE. Tallinn that were unfavorable to Russian-populated districts and privileged predominantly Estonian districts of Pirita and Nõmme, and the protection of Russian-language education. Nevertheless, the possibilities of changing situation in the mentioned spheres were hindered both by the fact that the KE was an opposition party in the Parliament, and a lack of political will on the part of its 44 The law was initiated by the Reform Party, Isamaaliit, Res Publica and the Social Democratic Party, and was intended to lay the ground for the removal of the Soviet soldier's monument from the centre of Tallinn, opposed by a vast majority of Estonia's Russian population. 45 Out of 21 deputies of the KE in the Parliament, 6 voted against the Law on the Protection of Military Cemeteries, 9 supported it, and 6 abstained from voting.
According to surveys conducted in the Estonian political parties, 47 not a single party claimed to have special strategies for attracting Russian votes.
The IRL had an explicitly Estonian-centered view on ethnicity issues, combining its insistence on integration of non-Estonians with an Estonian-centered vision of state, and stressing the necessity of "historical education" of Russianspeakers. In contrast, the KE and the RE claimed to have a balanced stance with regard to the whole of Estonia's population, regardless of ethnic affiliation, therefore seeing no need for special policies among non-Estonian population.
In the electoral appeals of the KE, 48 the party preferred to employ an approach cutting across ethnic lines, aimed at convincing the Russian-speaking voter that his interests harmonized with those of the overall population of Estonia, instead of emphasizing the distinct needs of the Russian community. The party contrasted itself to the ruling RE and IRL, presenting itself as the only alternative to their policies. Notably, the principles of the minority-related policies were not questioned; the KE's criticism targeted the ruling parties' economic and social policies. The KE invoked its own experience of ruling Tallinn, where it had 46 Similarly, having a majority in Tallinn City Assembly, the CP did not use this possibility for voicing the education question, although the law foresaw a possibility to introduce other languages of instruction with the consent of a majority of the school's parents and the council of trustees, the consent of the City Assembly, and the consent of the Government. population gave proof of susceptibility to this appeal, as it was directed to the population aware of its socioeconomic deprivation.
In addition, the Russians' support for the KE as a more representative channel of participation, compared to weak ethnic Russian parties, finds its explanation in research on the political culture of Estonia's Russians, which suggests a low degree of protest mood and proneness to adapt to the forces in power. 30 .000, the layout of national political arena would be noticeably different, shaped by a stronger performance of the political forces uniformly supported by the Russian voters. The 1995 elections marked the beginning of a long period during which the Estonian language requirements for obtaining citizenship were increasingly toughtened and led to an extreme reduction of the number of naturalized citizens per year. The number of naturalized Estonian citizens among adults was gradually declining each year and in the long run was minimized. New naturalized citizens were overwhelmingly children that had the right of obtaining citizenship after passing graduation examinations in the primary school. This showed an increasing alienation from the political system of people that had potential for successful integration: among non-citizens uneager to obtain Estonian citizenship, about 40% were younger than 45 years, 46% spoke Estonian, 40% felt strong or very strong attachment to Estonia, 76% claimed to love Estonia, and 92% considered Estonian citizenship policies to be too rigid and unjust toward non-Estonians. State officials, although admitting the importance of these figures, did not see necessity to introduce radical changes to citizenship policies. The political practice of the major Estonian parties proves that the right-wing Estonian parties (IRL and RE) opted for the first approach, de facto acting as ethnic majority parties and recurring to ethnic mobilization tactics vis-à-vis the majority electorate, whereas the KE framed its electoral appeal in civic terms. Therefore, the major political parties in Estonia gave proof of having polarized ethnic credentials, where ethnicity acts as a significant component of party labels.
In turn, polarized political preferences determine the uniformity of electoral preferences within the ethnic groups, to a considerable extent fitting the "ethnic census" description. In this situation, the minority electorate is influenced by the logic of "strategic voting", i.e. voting for the party that combines positive prospects of access to government with inclusivity towards minorities in an attempt to prevent the victory of minority-exclusive parties.
Thus, the internal political layout in Estonia is unfavorable to creating incentives for addressing relevant minority policies and for creating overarching civically-framed nation-wide spaces for social and political participation. In turn, the limited proneness of nation-wide parties to pursue minority policies has important implications for social, political and economic development of the ethnic minority community. As the strategies of equalizing ethnically-based social and economic
